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Of the many dilemmas faced by Theresa May in negotiating Britain’s withdrawal from the 
EU, finding a workable narrative to accompany Brexit proved one of the most intractable. 
She and her top government ministers alighted on the idea of “Global Britain”, unpacked in 
this article using qualitative discourse analysis. It begins by positioning the contribution in 
the literatures on constructivist approaches to British foreign policy. Next, it explains the 
method used to select the relevant sources, develop the codebook and interpret the data. The 
third section outlines the policy architecture intended to make GlobalBritain™ practical 
reality. The final section unpacks the accompanying “vision” behind GlobalBritain™, which 
is framed as the story of Britain escaping a damaging period of confinement inside the EU 
“prison”. The central argument is that GlobalBritain™ puts a marked Eurosceptic twist on a 
long-standing UK grand strategy aimed at remaining at the top table of global affairs using a 
pragmatic approach to international relationships. Always a troublesome arena for the 
conduct of its external relations, Brexit shows Britain continuing its half-in, half-out approach 
to European integration. The conclusion critically reflects on the research we can now 
conduct to discover more about this foreign policy narrative in-the-making.Like the 
politicians, scholars are still puzzled by the “why” and “how” of Brexit. This article 
contributes to the research on the “how” of Brexit by exploring the Conservative 
government’s foreign policy vision for Britain’s role in the world outside the EU. It first 
explains the contributions the research makes to constructivist-interpretivist foreign policy 
analysis. Next, it explains the method used to investigate the discursive substance of the 
GlobalBritain™ narrative: spatiality, temporality, ethicality and intertextuality. The third 
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section outlines the proposed policy architecture of GlobalBritain™. The final section reports 
the findings on the narrative side, showing how the discourse approach yielded 
comprehensive insights into this vision-in-the-making, bolstered by the politicians’ colourful 
use of metaphor. The central argument is that GlobalBritain™ puts a Conservative 
Eurosceptic twist on long-standing British foreign policy traditions, making for a negative, 
defensive narrative that will likely limit its resonance to key stakeholders domestically and 
internationally. The conclusions reflect on the utility of using this method to connect 
discourse analysts and foreign policy analysts and, thereby, its  potential to impact on the 
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So, is there any substance to the claim that GlobalBritain™ is a meaningful “turning 
point in our nation’s story” (Davis, 2016) – and how can we find out? Attacking 
GlobalBritain™ was, and will continue to be, another device for contesting Brexit. elites use 
epideictic rhetoric (unpacked in the methods section below) to generate and legitimise foreign 
policy narratives “through which they seek seeking “to unite the citizenry around a set of 
shared ideals and a common identity” (Atkins, 2015, pp. 603-605). Although this is 
understandable in such a febrile political climate, it is also unfortunate because 
GlobalBritain™ provides a fascinating insight into how elites use epideictic rhetoric 
(unpacked in the methods section below) to generate and legitimise foreign policy narratives 
“through which they seek to unite the citizenry around a set of shared ideals and a common 
identity” (Atkins, 2015, pp. 603-605). Finding answers to these questions is no simple task 
for two reasons. First, at the time of writing, GlobalBritain™ is happening but has not yet 
happened: it is “under construction”, literally and metaphorically, meaning that the 
constellation of material practices that will give concrete expression to the vision (such as 
trade deals and security agreements) have not yet been agreed or implemented. Second, 
lasting innovation in UK foreign policy is difficult to achieve, whether born of ideological 
choice (on New Labour’s “ethical dimension” see Little and Wickham-Jones 2000; Wheeler 
and Dunne, 2002; Daddow, 2011), or the exigencies of internal government management (on 
the 2010-2015 Coalition government’s “liberal Conservatism” (Beech, 2011; Clarke, 2015; 
Daddow and Schnapper, 2013; Daddow, 2015a). These governments have left important 
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legacies on the ground, but less of a mark on Britain’s post-1945 grand strategy, including an 
iit is high time that we step away from the heat of controversy and shine a light on what 
more informed debate about GlobalBritain™ andBrexit and the future of British foreign 
this article is to shine that light usingt.  According to this broad scholarly consensus, the 
consider assessing the shape of the contours of the vision it lays down for Britain’s foreign 
Brexit (May, 2017a). The opening section grounds rootsexplains the article’s contribution 
foreign policy analysis and the study of British foreign policy. The second section explains 
the rationale for treating the subject matter discursively (Milliken, 1999) and the method of 
theory of where Brexit decision-making lay in theof European policy decision-making in 
Section threewo outlines GlobalBritain™’s policy architecture using a four-pillar framework 
incorporating the mutually reinforcing instruments of its hard power – military, diplomatic 
economic – and soft power – the power to attract (Hill and Beadle, 2014) and persuade other 
states to the rightness of one’s national goals power dimensions(hard and soft power are 
2008); applied to the study of British foreign policy in Daddow, 2015a.; ). The final section 
audiences of the appropriateness of the journey on which Britain has embarked through 
Brexitfashion their into a story about the purpose and direction of Britain’s travel on leaving 
The prime argument belowcentral claim in what follows is that the policy architecture 
of GlobalBritain™ puts a Conservative Eurosceptic twist on long-standing British foreign 
policy traditions. The policy architecture is firmly in line with the “pragmatic” foreign policy 
tradition since 1945 (Honeyman, 2017) in British foreign policy since 194, aimed at 
promoting British prosperity, guaranteeing its security, 5and keeping Britain at the “top 
table” of global affairs through the careful calibration of its international relationships and 
institutional collaborations (Bratberg, 2011) (see above). Against this backdrop, Brexit has 
been packaged as a change of tactic in pursuit of a familiar grand strategy. .More novelty is 
evident on the narrative side, with GlobalBritain™ discourse  casting Britain as a captive 
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making a “great escape” from the EU “prison” (Rankin, 2018; Staunton, 2018). The 
variously, been described as a story of “redemption from the European venture” (Kenny and 
Pearce, 2018, p. 105), a former great power seeking “lost status” outside the EU (see 
Beaumont, 2017, pp. 385-387) and a an “escaping prisoner”, wrapped up in the Conservative 
after it had been subjugated by an empire” (von Bismarck, 2017). The article concludes by 
critically reflecting on  and a former great power seeking “lost status” outside the EU (see 
policy narrative in-the-making.. In a nutshell, May’s government has constructed Britain as a 
 
Interpreting Foreign Policy Narratives: A Discourse Approach 
 
Constructivists (see Bevir and Daddow, 2015) theorize foreign policy as a social 
activity with meaning-making at its heart (applied to the UK in Gaskarth, 2013). These 
meanings underpin and are given practical expression by foreign policy practices. Narratives 
are, therefore, widely considered to be vital to the process of defining Britain’s role in the 
world (see McCourt, 2014; Blagden, 2017; Blagden, 2018), but they are often explored well 
after the event , or treated as historical curiosities. It is rare to see narrative analysis applied 
contemporaneously at the policy development stage to untangle vision ideas literally and 
metaphorically as they are in the procesunder constructions of informing controversial or 
contested policy goals such as Brexit. Whilst this potentially leaves hostages to fortune, it 
also provides ways for academics to impact upon debates by providing richly contextual, 
systematically derived empiricalcontext sensitive evidence from a morass of often confusing 
text data, little of which usually makes it to the public domain, beyond the odd soundbite 
(Broad and Daddow, 2010). The articleIt finds much to commend Knud Erik Jørgensen’s 
(2015) opinion, therefore, that there is still much potential formuch value in cross-
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fertilizingation between discourse theoryorists on the one hand and foreign policy analysists 
 
Method 
But if we wish to interpret GlobalBritain™ as a foreign policy narrative, how do we do it 
discourse method for research adapted the discourse methointerpreting British European 
approach to identifying and analysing the relevant qualitative data.d explicated by Todd 
 
Step 1: Which texts? 
 
 Not being “inside” the policy-making process – andObserving things as an “outsider”,, on 
meant – means that we havinge to work with publicly available knowledge about how Brexit 
and who “authored” the main contours of the strategic communications. Most credible 
during her long stint running the Home Office (May 2010 to July 2016), May ran a “closed”, 
non-inclusive decision-making centralized operation (Pickard and Mance, 2017): “she does 
not care to share power any more than is necessary” (Usherwood, 2017).  
small, dedicated team” (Mohdin, 2018)  puts Mayher in line with many a previous UK prime 
minister confronted with “wicked” foreign and/or European policy dilemmas (Daddow, 
2011).   
the Cabinet Office (Casalicchio and Rutter, 2018), side-lining even supposedly heavyweight 
departments such as the FCO. the Cabinet Office and Downing Street (Casalicchio and 
Rutter, 2018). We can fairly assume that the same has been true, to varying degrees, for the 
other main government departments. The exigency of policy management by and from the 
centre became more obvious May’s grip over Brexit policy tightened as the withdrawal 
negotiations proceeded and fractures inside government began to appear (Kirby, 2018). For 
instance, at the time of writing DxEU had been led by three ministers: David Davis (July 
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2016-July 2018), Dominic Raab (July 2018-November 2018) and Stephen Barclay 
(November 2018-present), the first two resigning citing an overbearing Downing Street 
operation.  
Using this theory of how Brexit policy was made, the decision was made to focus on 
May and her top team in the formative early years of Brexit when the GlobalBritain™ script 
was being authored. It takes the story from July 2016 to a neat cut-off in July 2018, when 
Boris Johnson resigned from the FCO, hours after Davis left the DxEU. In effect, this was the 
first “wave” of GlobalBritain™ discourse: designing the strategy and establishing the 
essentials of the vision. In the same period Jeremy Hunt replaced Boris Johnson in July 2018. 
tracking how successful its proponents were in establishing its legitimacy in the minds of key 
stakeholders Nevertheless, by setting out the discourse terrain the article can be used as a tool 
of policy evaluation, as described in the conclusion. Table 1 sets out the main primary 
documentssources used to interpret GlobalBritain™. Reflecting the power structures 
described above, the focus is on May, aided and abetted in the crucial formative early months 
of Brexit by high profile figures from the Leave campaign, notably Boris Johnson at the 
Foreign Office, Liam Fox at the newly created Department for International Trade and David 
Davis at another newly created ministry, the Department for Exiting the European Union 
(DxEU). The core material is fleshed out with the words of other ministers such as Priti Patel 
(July 2016-November 2017) and Penny Mordaunt (November 2017-present) at the 
Department for International Development ‘s Downing Street operation, with the concentric 
circles of influence emanating out to the FCO, DxEU, Department of International Trade and 
DfID, thence to the diplomatic operation abroad (the latter not covered here).. At the core are 
speeches on Brexit, British foreign and European policy delivered by the key members of 
May into economic practice through free trade deals and so on’s foreign policy team. Then, 
there is an array ofThis data is complemented by reports plus those from think-tank 
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documents fromfrom  published by right-leaning think tanks known to have close 
(see for example O’Murchu and Mance, 2017).  which we use to understand more about the 
to sketchgenerate a picture of where, beyond Westminster, GlobalBritain™ was being 
and marketed. However, a full analysis of think-tanks and the production of GlobalBritain™ 
discourse will have to wait for another day.deliberated and advocated. Between them, the 
  
Step 2: Reading, analysing and reporting the Text Datathe text data 
This is not a content analysis of GlobalBritain™, concerned only or mainly with what was 
said and how oftenabout it, but a discourse analysis of how propositions are expressed , 
which foregrounds how “propositions are expressed, “on the basis that the linguistic choices 
[speakers] make are crucial for an analysis of what the text communicates” (Cameron and 
Panović, 2014, p. 67). The research questions driving the coding process were: (i) What was 
the proposed policy content of GlobalBritain™? (ii) How did GlobalBritain™ advocates 
explain,  and justify and thereby mobilize support for this vision for British foreign policy 
after Brexit? In line with established discourse methodology (Wetherell et al., 2009, p. 39), 
the research questions were answered by categorizsing and coding the text data to elicit the 
relevant keywords. In tightly controlled political messaging there is often frequent repetition 
within a politician’s oeuvre (temporally), as well as across speeches by different politicians at 
the same “moments” (spatially), making the keywords relatively easy to identify from a core 
corpus of texts, as described below. The keywords signal what is important to a given speaker 
and/or set of speakers and are used to work up a picture of the linguistic “hooks” on which 
the discourse hangs.  
, plus in tightly controlled political messaging there is often frequent repetition within 
that stays as faithful as possible to what the speakers appear to have wanted to convey by 
their words. By “piling up” quotations from the speakers on each of the themes sparked by 
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the research questions (policy content and “vision”, respectively) one can write a richly 
detailed account of what we think the speakers were getting at in phrasing things as they did. 
The research questions driving the coding process were: (i) What was the proposed policy 
foreign policy aspirations in several of the speeches and there was also a strong path 
dependency to the discourse. The script did not change much over the years 2016 to 2018. in 
any discernible way over identify from a surface reading. For exampleHelpfully, May’s 
January 2017 Lancaster House speech (May, 2017a) included a section halfway through 
section titled “A Truly Global Britain”.1) This passage which staked out her policy 
aspirations became the agreed “script” for describing Britain’s preferred foreign policy 
architecturepreferences post-Brexit, meaning the codebook on policy architecture was built 
around coding for words relating to hard and soft power, especially trade, the economy, 
security, science and innovation.. The rest of the speeches showed that neither May nor her 
ministers deviated from this initial template in any significant way. I am confident, therefore, 
                                                          
1 See the online appendix which shows how to code a speech using research questions. A full codebook is 
available on request. 
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that the four-pillar framework for interpreting the policy horizons of GlobalBritain™, set out 
Getting at the narrative and “vision” components identity strand of GlobalBritain™ 
discourse required a more nuanced reading of the material, necessitating attention to the 
epideictic rhetoric through which foreign policy elites consolidate national community 
identity through exclusions and aattention to the differentiations drawn in the texts between 
what social psychologists call what social psychologists call “in-groups” and “out-groups” 
(Beaumont, 2017, p. 380), or , and what political scientists refer to as the national “Self” and 
international “Others” (Atkins, 2015, p. 605; Jørgensen, 2015, p. 501). In British European 
foreign policy discourse this antithesis has tended to surface , historically, in tales of an 
“island” Britain set apart from continental European machinations, only involving itself when 
absolutely necessary for urgent security reasons or to protect vital, mainly economic, interests 
(Saunders, 2018). initially as “balancer” in the Victorian heyday of Empire (Daddow, 2015) 
and, in the twentieth century, as a lone or one of a few “good” powers battling Europe’s 
tyrannical dictators when they threatened to dominate the continental against British interests 
(Saunders, 2018).  
While interconnected and overlapping in important ways, they are reported separately 
below for reasons of clarity. In line with previous findings on political oratory (von 
Bismarck, 2017; Charteris-Black, 2005, p. 26; see also Finlayson, 2007) the data also 
indicated that metaphors did a lot of heavy lifting in constructing the in the construction of 
GlobalBritain™ vision, so and these became an equally important component of the 
codebook. MIn brief, metaphors are creative associations in language used to make “your 
hearers see things” by bringing “something fresh” to an audience’s cognitive and emotional 
engagement with a given issue (Aristotle, 2012, p. 182 and p. 179). That political oratory 
“deals with future events” (Aristotle, 2012, p. 161) using evidence culled from history, makes 
journey metaphors particularly useful to the politicians who want to spell out where a country 
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has come from, where it is, the dilemmas it faces and where they want to take it as navigatory 
devices. In the what was over the years 2016-2018 aninsurgent narrative-in-the-making in 
GlobalBritain™,5  where concrete progress was always likely to be behind the need for a 
vision, we would expect the metaphorical imagination to play an even more important role. 
As shown below, this proved to be the case, with journey, lightness/darkness and family 
metaphors were all in operation . Having positioned the contribution and explained the 
method, the remainder of the article reports the findings. While all of these thematic elements 
and linguistic devices cross-cut in important ways, they are reported separately below for the 
purposes of clarity.  
The initial codebook was drawn up using the government’s most influential purveyors 
of Global Britain™ discourse: Theresa May (2017a), Boris Johnson (2017) and Liam Fox 
(2016). It was expanded – albeit not significantly – as further sources were brought to the 
                                                          
5 I have borrowed the telling word “insurgent” from one of the anonymous reviewer’s comments on an earlier 
draft.  
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table.6 The keywords signal what is important to a given speaker, but crucially they – or their 
Policy architecture: the four pillars of GlobalBritain™ 
Figure 1 sets down the proposed policy architecture for policy vision underpinning 
GlobalBritain™.. Given the paramountcy of economics to the Brexit debate has resulted in a 
national conversation “monopolised by the future trade and customs relationship” (Ricketts, 
2018a), it is important to note that, away from specialized publications (for instance Kienzle 
and Hallams, 2016), the wider policy political, defence and security objectives have had less 
of an airing. The take-home theoretical point in this section is, therefore, that a sober 
discourse reading, away from the heat of Brexit minutiae, can shed light on themes and issues 
forgotten in the cut and thrust of a poliarized policy debate such as that instigated by Brexit.   
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The Pillar 1 priority for Global Britain isPillars 1 and 2 of GlobalBritain™ are about 
economics and the requirement to replace Britain’s financial benefits from its expiring EU 
membership with new financial relationships with and beyond the EU. Top billing goes to 
Pillar 1 and  “a bold and ambitious free trade agreement with the European Union” covering 
goods and services (May 2017a). This plays to a long tradition in the British Conservative 
Party and British European policy, where the politics of integration, especially concerning the 
loss of sovereignty involved, were hotly contested from Thatcher’s September 1988 Bruges 
speech onward (Thatcher, 1988; Fontana and Parsons, 2015; Vail, 2015;). The British always 
preferred to construe European integration instrumentally as a source of nourishment for the 
domestic economy. The economic benefits of membership of the Single European Market 
(SEM), plus those accruing to the City of London as a global financial hub, were reasons why 
even the EU’s harshest detractors in Britain acquiesced in membership for so long. 
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This Discourse in pillarPillars 1 and 2 drew on an influential stand of economic 
liberalism in Conservative Party thought, interweaving several propositions in support of an 
exceptionalist narrative (elaborated in Atkins, 2015) about seemed to be drawing on long 
established strands of Conservative Party thinking about Britain’s role in the global political 
economy: first, that Britain was the architect ofbuilt the global free trade system in the 
nineteenth century; second, that free trade is a powerful force for good economically and 
politically; third, that Britain is uniquely well placed to benefit from free trade; fourth, that 
the EU’s “highly regulated and expensive Single Market and Customs Union approach” 
inhibited Britain from achieving its “historic mission of supporting global free trade” 
(Stewart and Monteith, 2016, p. 2); and, finally, in terms of ethicality and imperial 
temporality, that the spread of free trade supplies the “a moral dimension to our mission” 
(Fox, 2017; see also Johnson, 2016). Intertextuality was in operation at this point, with Priti 
Patel (2017) name-checking Thatcher to argue of free trade that it is “one of the most 
dynamic forces for good in the world. It creates jobs, and fosters peace. It raises incomes and 
it unleashes the power of private enterprise. It changes individual lives, and by doing so it can 
transform entire economies.”  
 Pillar 3 shifts from the hard power of economics to the softer power ofpolitics and 
culture,7 the aim being ing to create “a far-reaching science and innovation pact with the EU” 
(May, 2018c). This is to be anchored in “our academic and scientific communities…some of 
the world’s best universities… And… cutting-edge research and innovation” (May, 2017a). 
May envisaged cooperation on space exploration, clean energy and medical technologies 
(May, 2017a), as fleshed out in her February 2018 Munich Security Conference speech (May, 
2018b). Pillar 3 of GlobalBritain™ drew soft power comparative advantages that have been 
staples of elite foreign policy thinking for decades (see also Newman et al., 2017). In 1997, 
                                                          
7 For a characteristic list of Britain’s hard and soft power capabilities, see “The Prize” segment of (Davis, 2016). 
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for example, Chancellor Gordon Brown (1997) eulogized the pioneering spirit and the 
“British Genius” (invoking George Orwell’s wartime essay on socialism and the “English 
Genius”) which Brown believed marked the country out for a leadership role in Europe and 
globally. May insinuated the same by referring to “the talents of our people” (May, 2018b; 
May, 2018c; May, 2018d). Johnson (2017) averred that British leadership would be exerted 
through the efforts of “inventors, scientists, business people, students and dreamers.”  
Pillar 4 deals with hard power politics,the hard power dimension of security 
cooperation between Britain and its European partners on “[cross-border] crime, terrorism 
and foreign affairs”. The latter was geared towards containing “dangers presented by hostile 
states”, not least Russia (May, 2017a), which under Putin was persistently accused of 
transgressing the norms and rules of international society, including through its “reckless use 
of chemical weapons on the streets of Britain by agents of the Russian GRU [Russian 
military intelligence]” (May, 2018c). May (2017d) wanted practical measures around law 
enforcement and intelligence sharing, formalised in “a treaty between the UK and the 
EU.”The goal, according to Davis (2017b), was “a strategic partnership that allows us to 
tackle the full range of threats we face”. Taken togetherBetween them, the four pillars of 
GlobalBritain™ tell us what the government wanted from its international relationships after 
Brexit, prolonging decades-worth of thinking on how to secure British interests and promote 
its values in the global arena (Gilmore, 2014; Daddow, 2015a). The next section reports how 
the policy proposals were framed through an investigation into the narrative underpinnings of 
GlobalBritain™.   
 
GlobalBritain™: plotting the “great escape” 
As explained in the methods section, to map GlobalBritain™’s discursive terrain is to 
consider it as “a coherent and comprehensive set of representations” (Todd, 2016, 23; 
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emphasis in original), revolving around (ibid., citing Hansen; and agreeing with Daddow, 
using representative illustrations from the text data. 
 
Othering via differentiationSelf and Other 
Othering was achieved by comparing and contrasting “British” identity, interests and values 
with those of its “European” neighbours, pointing out elements of overlap and difference. It is 
a fact, said May, that Britain and Europe “share common interests and values and so much 
else” (May, 2017c), making Britain, in Johnson’s words, “one of the great quintessential 
European nations” (Johnson, 2017; see also Davis, 2017a). The unavoidable reality of 
existing in a shared geographic space had has encouraged the build-up of a dense web of 
cultural and commercial ties over centuries, or “lived, shared experiences”” rooted in 
“centuries-old shared cultural, social and economic ties that exist between us” (Davis, 
2017b). This observation anchored one of May’s most common soundbites (2017d): “We 
may be leaving the European Union, but we are not leaving Europe.”. May drew on both 
Labour’s internationalism (May, 2017c) as well as thinking more familiar to Conservatives 
from Thatcher’s Bruges speech onward (Thatcher, 1988; Daddow, 2013) that: “We are a 
European country – and proud of our shared European heritage” (May, 2017a). Britain’s 
values of “peace, democracy, human rights and the rule of law” (May, 2017d; May, 2018b) 
were sometimes presented as unique to Britain, at other times not specific to Britain, 
whichunique: “is not the only member state where there is a strong attachment to accountable 
and democratic government, such a strong internationalist mindset, or a belief that diversity 
within Europe should be celebrated” (May, 2017a).  
 All tThis said, the government believed that whatever historico-cultural affinities 
Britain shared with “Europe”, it did not feel sufficiently “EU” to remain embedded in the 
organizationthe people had spoken in the referendum. Davis explained (2016) that Britain 
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always saw the EU “differently” from its “European neighbours” because of different 
historical trajectories and “that has been one of the problems”. Johnson (2016) concurred that 
the referendum result proved that the British could never “endorse the finalité politique of the 
EU” because it embodied a cornucopia of differences from the British way of “doing” 
governance: 
 
Our political traditions are different. Unlike other European countries, we have no 
written constitution, but the principle of Parliamentary Sovereignty is the basis of our 
unwritten constitutional settlement. We have only a recent history of devolved 
governance…and we have little history of coalition government (May 2017a; see also 
May, 2017b) . 
 
One of the stated causes of the differentiation between “Europe” on the one hand and 
“Britain” on the other, was Britain’s status of an island cut adrift from mainland Europe by 
the English (not British) Channel, opening the way to consider the spatial elements ofity the 
discursive construction of GlobalBritain™ discourse. 
 
Spatiality 
Mobilizing Britain’s island geography prompted the producers of GlobalBritain™ prompted 
discourse to imagine “Europe” as an inconvenient or even hostile outlet for the expression of 
Britishness, driving a further wedge between the two imagined entities of “Britain” and 
“Europe”.8 It is evident that Henrietta Marshall’s famous 1905 school history textbook, Our 
Island Story, has had a strong hold over the national historical imaginary back to Victorian 
                                                          
8 The imposition of Conservative interpretations of Englishness onto UK foreign policy and GlobalBritain™ 
discourse is beyond the remit of this article, but see (Kumar, 2003; Marquand, 2009; Vail, 2015)., suffice to say 
it further weakens the resonance of the narrative in Remain-voting countries such as Scotland.  
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times (see Daddow, 2011; Brocklehurst, 2015; Wellings, 2018). Its account of English and 
British history has sustained two important spatializing narratives that surfaced in the 2016 
membership referendum campaign and, later, and after, now fuellingGlobalBritain™’s 
spatializing dimensions.  
First, the requirement to uphold a loosely defined notion of British “sovereignty” 
(Ichijo, 2008; Todd, 2016) in the face of sovereignty-degrading practices in the EU 
(Thatcher, 1988). This was exemplified in theMay’s claim that, after Brexit, Britain would be 
“in control of its own destiny once again [as in pre-1973, when it joined the European 
Community]” (May, 2017, emphasis added). This “control” purportedly extends over a 
variety of policy areas such as national borders, immigration numbers (Davis, 2016) and 
national security (Davis, 2017a). The second important spatializing narrative has been the 
perceived imperative to uphold a historically constituted sense of “traditional” (pre-
Community entry) British identity in the face of “centralizing” tendencies in the maligned 
“Brussels” institutions, especially those downloaded from the European Commission and 
other institutions staffed by what are described as unelected “bureaucrats”. In this Thathcerite 
vein, May (2017a) said her biggest problems with the EU wereas its “supranational 
institutions” (May, 2017a) thatit “struggled to deal with the diversity of its member countries 
and their interests. It bends towards uniformity, not flexibility.” And third, as David 
Marquand has shown (2009, pp. 11-12), the historically constituted narrative of which 
proclaims the island people to be a ‘providential nation’, ‘uniquely freedom-loving, and at the 
same time uniquely oceanic and uniquely imperial’.  
The political implications of these spatializing narratives were clearly articulated by 
May in the Florence speech (2017d), where she suggested that because Britain was of being 
geographically separate from mainland Europe, “the European Union never felt to us like an 
integral part of our national story in the way it does to so many elsewhere in Europe”. After 
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1945, GlobalBritain™ enthusiastsentrepreneur remarked, Britain’s international journey had 
taken on a qualitatively different character from that of “core (integrationist) Europe”. As 
Johnson put it, a “group of European countries” integrated regionally, while Britain and the 
US “had a different approach” (Johnson, 2016), carrying out a global mission as part of the 
post-war “Big Three” and, later “Big Five” UN powers that haves “defined the modern 
world” (May, 2017b), as well as being “present at the creation” of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) as the irredeemable guarantor of European security (on Brexit and 
NATO see Dunne and Webber, 2016). Summing up the “exceptionalist” element of this 
discourse, Fox (2016) reflected that the British story was one of triumph against all odds: “‘A 
small island perched on the edge of Europe became the world’s largest and most powerful 
trading nation”’ (see also Davis, 2016; Fox, 2017). Britain’s national trajectory, he implied, 
had simply been out of step with Europe’s, and Brexit was the practical realization of that 
“fact” of international life.  
 
Temporality 
The post-Brexit direction of Britain’s journey through international history was captured in a 
series of lightness/darkness metaphors representing Britain as a place of progress and 
enlightenment in contrast to the EU’s zone of “backwardness and intransigence” (Todd, 
2016, p. 31). Outside the EU, the framing went, Britain’s “future is bright” (May, 2018c) 
because it could once more operate as an international “beacon” when it regained its status as 
an “independent trading nation” (Fox, 2016; see also Singham, 2017, pp. 3-4).9 The assertion 
that Britain could resist any Brexit-induced decline by operating as a “beacon for good for the 
world” also appeared in the Global Britain report (Stewart and Monteith, 2016, pp. 15-16 and 
                                                          
9 The marked use of the word “beacon” to describe Britain’s international “character” evokes the “Britain 
“standing alone in 1940” frame supported by a “lightness” metaphor, showing the overlapping nature of 
spatiality, temporality and ethicality, all of which can be captured in single words or metaphors.  
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18). Other examples of lightness/darkness metaphors of the light-dark, semi-religious 
(2017c) that in the 2016 referendum the British people “fixed their eyes on that brighter 
future and chose a bold, ambitious course”; second, May (2017a) and Davis’s (2016) (2017a) 
description of Britain beingassertions that Britain was on a journey to “a brighter future for 
our country” or “a brighter and better future” respectively, one in which it could “make the 
most of the opportunities ahead”; fourth, Fox’s (2016) reflections on creating a “bright 
future”, one not to be “darkened by the shadows of [implicitly EU] protectionism”; and 
finally, Johnson’s (2017) concern that Britain not end up living out its days “in some dingy 
ante-room of the EU”, which as May surmised (May, 2017a) would place Britain in a kind of 
“permanent political purgatory”..  
 
Ethicality 
Ethicality shone through whenever Britain was personified, as frequently it was, as “by 
instinct and history a great global nation” (May, 2017b). We have also seenWe saw 
previously that the idea moral judgements around the concept of Britain rediscovering lost or 
repressed “freedom” was an important constituent of GlobalBritain™ discourse. It was 
encapsulated in allusions, first, to bothEthicality around Britain as anthe exceptional nation 
with a unique contribution to make to global politics was, therefore, found to reside inand, 
second, metaphors depictiongs Britain as a prisoner returning to his/her former life following 
an unhappy period of incarceration inside the EU. This echoed Eurosceptic discourse that 
gained popularity around the time of the debate over the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2004 
(later the Lisbon Treaty), the Daily Mail arguing that EU member states were “hopeless 
captives of an all-encompassing, antidemocratic bureaucracy with a life of its own” (cited 
Ichijo, 2008, p. 79). In contrast, the EU was characterized as a “corpse” (Mason, 2012) a 
group of “losers” making a deadweight bloc in decline, holding Britain back. Nothing was 
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more unpalatable to pro-Brexit politicians than “staying shackled to the EU” because it 
portended only further “national humiliation” (Fysh, 2018) or the realization of “vassal 
status” (Jacob Rees-Mogg cited Clegg, 2018) as a “colony” of the EU (Johnson, 2018).  
In GlobalBritain™ discourse, the cascading metaphors around darkness/lightness and 
family underscored the righteousness of the journey on which Britain had embarked with 
Brexit. On leaving its prison, GlobalBritain™, said, Britain could once againonce more 
“embrace the world” after Brexit (May, 2017a), a figure of speech operating at the nexus of 
spatiality and ethicality. May went big on the word “embrace” throughout her speeches (May, 
2017c); it was also used several times in the report by the Legatum Institute (Stroud, 2017; 
Singham et al., 2017, p. 4). “Embrace” has two connotations: to accept something 
enthusiastically, or to hold someone closely in one’s arms as a sign of affection. While both 
are poignant, the latter is particularly especially resonant in the context of GlobalBritain™ for 
two reasons. First, it suggests that the EU was preventing Britain expressing its “higher moral 
loyalty” to the Commonwealth and US, arising from “ties of family, kinship and history” 
(May, 2017b). Second, it establisheds the Commonwealth, US and Anglosphere as  better 
more aligned tthan was the EU for the fulfilment of British interests, values via the enactment 
of its global leadership role.behind Britain’s “determination to lead a race to the top in global 
standards” (Davis, 2017a).  
There were said to be fewer or no such problems with these alternative outlets for the 
exertion of British agency in the global arena. As Kenny and Pearce suggest (2018, pp. 164 
and 169), returning to the Commonwealth and former settler colonies of the Anglosphere 
(Hannan, 2014), would embody a return to “familiar” outlets for the expression of Britain’s 
international agency. The Anglosphere has always occupied a distinctive role in the 
Conservative political imagination (Wellings and Baxendale, 2015). It is the name given to 
the core five countries in the Commonwealth (UK, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the 
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US) with which Britain is said to share a number of defining features: “liberal market 
economies, the common law, parliamentary democracy, and a history of Protestantism” 
(Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 3-5; Vucetic, 2011). In contrast to the wedges driven by 
GlobalBritain™ advocates between “Britain” and “Europe”, through Brexit, Britain and the 
EU would be negotiating a “partnership” between “neighbours” (May, 2018c). They would 
not be “embracing” but working pragmatically and technocratically, “hand in hand” (May, 
2017d; emphasis added). In sum, the “deep and special partnership” with the EU wasis, 
however, said implied to be less meaningful to British interests, self-identity and sense of its 
place in the worldBritain than the Commonwealth or the “special relationship” with the US, 
in July 2018 elevated by Trump on his visit to Britain as “the highest level of special” 
(Walker, 2018).  
 
Conclusions 
This article interpret GlobalBritain™ by using discourse analysis to unpack the two staple 
ingredients of foreign policy visions: the policies states aim at through their external practices 
and the accompanying narrative that frames and justifies those national policy choices to 
domestic and global audiences. On the policy side, the text data suggests that GlobalBritain™ 
continues the “pragmatic” tradition in British foreign policy, themed around the dogged 
pursuit of vital British economic and security interests through the exercise of its hard and 
soft power capabilities. This may seem surprising given the scale of the rupture in Britain’s 
international relationships wrought about by Brexit. It makes more sense when it is 
recognized that continuity of grand strategy, occasionally requiring tactical recalibration, is 
ultimately what has animated British foreign policy for decades if not centuries (Bourne, 
1970; Black, 2000). In a very real sense, the dominant GlobalBritain™ narrative evokes that 
surrounding Britain’s applications and entry to the European Communities in 1973, which 
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were sold as a change of tactic to achieve higher strategic ambitions, including a global 
“leadership” role (Daddow and Gaskarth, 2014). In a recent article in the pages of this 
journal, Paul Beaumont (2017, p. 380) argued that the saliency of Euroscepticism increased 
in UK politics over the last three decades around an influential consensus that “EU 
membership is especially threatening to Britain’s historical narrative of the self”. As the 
phrasing suggests, this was as much a narrative problem for pro-Europeans, as it was an 
empirical of demonstrating the “facts” of what Britain did in/for the EU, and conversely what 
the EU did in/for Britain (see Daddow and Oliver, 2016). This article corroborated 
Beaumont’s argument about the importance of identity to an understanding of both the “why” 
and “how” of Brexit, by showing that GlobalBritain™ discourse is a bricolage of spatial, 
temporal and ethical propositions about Britain, its identity and role in the world, constructed 
against a malign “European” Other across the English Channel. This narrative construction 
was circulating before Brexit, but after 2016 was laced with Conservative Euroscepticism 
that brought the Othering practices more abruptly and bluntly to the fore.  
The above findings on this vision in-the-making also give us the analytical tools for 
evaluating what might make GlobalBritain™ a “success”. Obviously a “successful” Brexit 
will be key but that itself is a political judgement and one that will be helped by 
GlobalBritain™ taking hold as an accepted narrative about Britain’s “new” role in the world. 
The questions future research needs to address to assess the effectiveness of this foreign 
policy vision are, therefore:The above discussion also suggests that the discourse method can 
be deployed as a tool of critical policy evaluation, because it is parsimonious and avoids overt 
jargonizing , which means it can easily “travel” across academic fields (connecting discourse 
theorists with foreign policy analysts) and from academia to policy (Cairney and Oliver, 
2018; Craig, 2019). The requirement for an analytical toolkit for dealing with politicians’ 
responses to current policy dilemmas is evident. British foreign policy-makers have long 
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avoided scrutinising the habits of thought and practice on which they base their decisions, 
(ii) Do domestic stakeholders they believe GlobalBritain™ promotes vital British interests ? 
fundamental British values? (iii) How has GlobalBritain™ been marketed internationally 
using public diplomacy at the UN (adding to Gifkins et al., 2019), ambassadorial speeches 
and the practices of the main government departments? (iv) Where have we seen “resistance” 
or “rival” narratives and what effect have they had in influencing the reception of the central 
narrative? And perhaps most crucially Underlying all this is the most vital question of all: (iv) 
one that outlasts the May government, get implemented institutionally and last, , or is it 
government (on narrative as a tool of policy evaluation see Craig, 2019)? As with so much 
around Brexit, the future remains uncertain. But knowing where to look and how to let the 
evidence “breathe”, scholars should be able to contribute to informed conversations about the 
most vexed questions surrounding Brexit and Britain’s future world role.     
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